Clausewitz saw war as a shared complexity between the government, military and the people, while Jomini viewed war in terms of the victorious hero dominating the battle field with manageable principles of war.1,2
Principles of both Clausewitz and Jomini writings on War coexist within US Department of Defense doctrine and senior leadership thinking.
Jomini was the first of his time period to document operational principles of war, which he called “grand tactics.” 3 Field Manual 3-0 of U.S. Military Doctrine defines nine principles of war which contain four primary elements of Jomini’s fundamental operational principles, offensive, mass, maneuver and economy of force.1,4 U.S. doctrine states, “As a principle of war, offensive is synonymous with initiative.”4 Which directly matches up with Jominian tactics, he strongly supported gaining and maintaining the initiative through offensive operations as does the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0.1,4 Both consider the offense as the decisive choice of war and both consider defensive only rational as a middle ground moving back toward the offense.1,4 Further evidence of the U.S. Army’s Jominian operations character lies in its similarities of Lines of Operation. “Interior lines usually represent central position, where a friendly force can reinforce or concentrate its elements faster than the enemy force can reposition.” 5 U.S Army Field Manual 3-0 devotes large sections of Chapters five and six to this major Jominian concept. Jomini’s original strategy of “interior lines,” suggested pure contiguous lines of operation focusing on the advantages of interior versus exterior lines of operation.6 The U.S. Army continues to document a desire to maintain the same relationship especial for contiguous linear battlefields. 5
American army planner’s focus on decisive points and the calculating application of military theory to provide the commander with solutions to problems in war, this further suggests the Jominian character in U.S....