The Form of Good (Arguments)

Although the comparison of the Form of Good to the sun in Plato’s Republic is comparatively sound in its rhetorical strategies, the basis of the comparison of the Form of Good to the Sun, and thus the whole argument altogether, operates under a premise that is inherently inaccurate.   Because of this solecism, Socrates’s argument is ultimately rendered ineffective, as it cannot stand up to a school of thought less narrow in nature.   Plato’s Theory of Forms suggests that there is only one Form of Good and that there everything that is good is homogeneously good, a point that is so extreme that it can be almost immediately discarded and deemed ineffective.   Furthermore, Plato’s Theory and, in this excerpt, Socrates’s argument ultimately do not succeed in explaining what they intend to explain.   Upon a close reading of this passage, it is easy to see the flaws in Socrates’s ideas as he makes this comparison, in view of the fact that his argument relies heavily on assumptions and absolutes.   In addition, in his dialog with Glaucon, Socrates bases some of his ideas on logical fallacies, which by and large help in crippling his argument.
In this passage, Socrates articulates Plato’s Theory of the Form of Good under the assumption that all things considered “good” are each “good” in the same sorts of ways, as well as for the same sorts of reasons.   In his dialog with Glaucon, Socrates says, “…that what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the Form of the Good,” which implies that only things that are known to us can be good, when in fact, many other good things that are unknown may also be considered good (508e).   For instance, when Socrates struggles to explain to Glaucon exactly what the Form of Good is, he laments the fact that he is ultimately unable to provide a perfect, or even adequate, explanation of such a thing (507a).   This admission to Glaucon clearly betrays the fact that Socrates does not have the knowledge required in...